Brain Disease

Final Paper: Brain Disease At the beginning of this week, you were introduced to the idea of mental illness as a disease rather than a set of symptoms or behavior. Physiological psychology forms the basis for this paradigm shift. A better understanding of mental illness and its associated symptoms/behavior will result from the combination of both a psychological and biological model of study.

Assignment Instructions For your final project, choose a mental illness to research from both a biological and a psychological standpoint. Look at causes of the mental illness (both biological and environmental), brain structures affected by the illness, hormonal differences in the nervous system, neural pathways affected, etc. You will also need to include a section on treatment options and the specific physiological effects of the chosen treatment method on the nervous system.

In conclusion of your assignment, include a paragraph on the importance of using a combination of physiology and psychology in understanding the illness you chose. What insight would be missing without one perspective or the other (physiology or psychology)?

You will need to include in-text citations from at least four different resources. Your assignment should also include an introduction, body and conclusion with a reference page listing the resources you cited. Include at least one paragraph for each of the following sections:

Introduction: introduce the mental illness and its importance Body Biological view of the mental illness Psychological view of the mental illness Brain structures affected by the mental illness (including structures, locations, hormones, neural pathways, etc) Treatment options and physiological effects of treatment Conclusion: importance of using both physiology AND psychology to understand the mental illness Reference Page: four reference entries that correlate with in-text citations

Should you have any questions regarding this assignment, direct them to your course facilitator.

Format Requirements Document Type

MS Word

Paper Size

8.5 X 11"

Length

4-5 pages

Margins

1"

Font

Times or Times New Roman, 12 pt.

Line Spacing

Double. No extra double space between paragraphs, please.

In-text Citations & Reference List Style

APA

Paper Structure

Introduction Body Conclusion Reference Page File Naming Convention

LastNameFirstNameFinalPaper Example: DoeJohnFinalPaper

Submission After preparing your assignment in Microsoft Word, you will submit it, as an attachment below. When you are ready, scroll down to access the +File attachment area.

Upload the file first, then write something in the input box, such as "Please see attached." Then, you will see the ORANGE save button appear. Click the button to submit your assignment.

Questions? Questions about this assignment? Feel free to post them in the Ask Questions forum, which you can access by clicking the "Discussions" tab from top of the Course Outline.

Answer Files Drop files here The file size should not be more than 300 MB

 

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Biology Assignment Help

Part 1 :

Describe the characteristics of water and carbon that makes them important to living things in general, and to specific forms of life including plants, animals, and prokaryotes. Why is NASA, for example, looking for water on Mars?

Part 2 :

Describe the differences in prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells. How have the characteristics of each kind of cell put limitations and provided opportunities for the survival and divergence of modern living things? Why might both cell types be considered equally successful? Make sure to consider both Domains of Prokaryotes.

 

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Chapter 7 of David & Goliath by Malcolm Gladwell

For the questions below, write answers in complete sentences.

1. According to economists Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe of the Rand Corporation, what was the best way for governments and police to deal with civil unrest or terrorism?

2. In explaining the principle of legitimacy, Gladwell notes that “how you punish is as important as the act of punishing itself” (208). Why does the way we punish impact the effectiveness?

3.Joanne Jaffe was the police chief who started the turkey distribution for the Juvenile Robbery Intervention Program in Brownsville. What was Jaffe’s philosophy about combatting crime (in contrast to Leites and Wolfe’s philosophy)?

4.Reflection: Was this chapter more about Davids or Goliaths? What is Gladwell’s point in this chapter?

 

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college essay

my prompt:
The lessons we take from obstacles we encounter can be fundamental to later success.
Recount a time when you faced a challenge, setback, or failure. How did it affect you, and
what did you learn from the experience?

 

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Animal Right

Read pages attached file and write “reading notes” on the assigned pages. These notes can be handwritten then scanned, or they can be typed and uploaded as a document. What I want you to do is write your reflections on the readings whether that is bullet points of the main ideas, questions you have about the readings, a summary of the main points, definitions of new words you encounter, or any other comments that enable me to see that you have engaged in reading the material.

I regard myself as an advocate of animal
rights—as a part of the animal rights movement. That movement, as I conceive
it, is committed to a number of goals, including, • the total abolition of the
use of animals in science; • the total dissolution of commercial animal
agriculture; • the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and
trapping. There are, I know, people who profess to believe in animal rights but
do not avow these goals. Factory farming, they say, is wrong—it violates
animals’ rights—but traditional animal agriculture is all right. Toxicity tests
of cosmetics on animals violates their rights, but important medical
research—cancer research, for example—does not. The clubbing of baby seals is
abhorrent, but not the harvesting of adult seals. I used to think I understood
this reasoning. Not anymore. You don’t change unjust institutions by tidying
them up.

the leg-hold trap is agonizing. But what is wrong isn’t the pain,
isn’t the suffering, isn’t the deprivation. These compound what’s wrong.
Sometimes—often—they make it much, much worse. But they are not the fundamental
wrong.

The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals
as our resources, here for us—to be eaten, or surgically manipulated, or
exploited for sport or money. Once we accept this view of animals—as our
resources—the rest is as predictable as it is regrettable. Why worry about
their loneliness, their pain, their death? Since animals exist for us, to
benefit us in one way or another, what harms them really doesn’t matter—or
matters only if it starts to bother us, makes us feel a trifle uneasy when we
eat our veal escalope, for example. So, yes, let us get veal calves out of
solitary confinement, give them more space, a little straw, a few companions.
But let us keep our veal escalope.

But a little straw, more space and a few companions won’t
eliminate—won’t even touch—the basic wrong that attaches to our viewing and
treating these animals as our resources. a veal calf killed to be eaten after
living in close confinement is viewed and treated in this way: but so, too, is
another who is raised (as they say) “more hu- manely.” To right the wrong of
our treatment of farm animals re- quires more than making rearing methods “more
humane”; it requires the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture.

how we do this, whether we do it or, as in the case of animals in
science, whether and how we abolish their use—these are to a large extent
political questions. People must change their beliefs before they change their
habits. enough people, especially those elected to public office, must believe
in change—must want it—before we will have laws that protect the rights of
animals. This process of change is very complicated, very demanding, very
exhausting, calling for the efforts of many hands in education, publicity,
political organization and activity, down to the licking of envelopes and
stamps. as a trained and practising philosopher, the sort of contribution I can
make is limited but, I like to think, important. The currency of philosophy is
ideas—their meaning and rational foundation—not the nuts and bolts of the
legislative process, say, or the mechanics of community organization. That’s
what I have been exploring over the past ten years or so in my essays and talks
and, most recently, in my book, The Case for Animal Rights. I believe the major
conclusions I reach in the book are true because they are supported by the
weight of the best arguments. I believe the idea of animal rights has reason,
not just emotion, on its side.

In the space I have at my disposal here I can only sketch, in the
barest outline, some of the main features of the book. Its main themes—and we
should not be surprised by this—involve asking and answering deep, foundational
moral questions about what morality is, how it should be understood, and what
is the best moral theory, all considered. I hope I can convey something of the
shape I think this theory takes. The attempt to do this will be (to use a word
a friendly critic once used to describe my work) cerebral, perhaps too
cerebral. But this is misleading. My feelings about how animals are sometimes
treated run just as deep and just as strong as those of my more volatile
compatriots. Philosophers do—to use the jargon of the day—have a right side to
their brains. If it’s the left side we contribute (or mainly should), that’s
because what talents we have reside there.

how to proceed? We begin by asking how the moral status of ani-
mals has been understood by thinkers who deny that animals have rights. Then we
test the mettle of their ideas by seeing how well they stand up under the heat
of fair criticism. If we start our thinking in this way, we soon find that some
people believe that we have no duties directly to animals, that we owe nothing
to them, that we can do nothing that wrongs them. Rather, we can do wrong acts
that involve animals, and so we have duties regarding them, though none to
them. Such views may be called indirect duty views. By way of illustra- tion:
suppose your neighbour kicks your dog. Then your neighbour has done something
wrong. But not to your dog. The wrong that has been done is a wrong to you.
after all, it is wrong to upset people, and your neighbour’s kicking your dog
upsets you. So you are the one who is wronged, not your dog. Or again: by
kicking your dog your neigh- bour damages another person’s property. and since
it is wrong to damage another person’s property, your neighbour has done some-
thing wrong—to you, of course, not to your dog. Your neighbour no more wrongs
your dog than your car would be wronged if the wind- shield were smashed. Your
neighbour’s duties involving your dog are indirect duties to you. More
generally, all of our duties regarding ani- mals are indirect duties to one
another—to humanity.

how could someone try to justify such a view? Someone might say
that your dog doesn’t feel anything and so isn’t hurt by your neigh- bour’s
kick, doesn’t care about pain since none is felt, is as unaware of anything as
is your windshield. Someone might say this, but no ratio- nal person will,
since, among other considerations, such a view will commit anyone who holds it
to the position that no human being feels pain either—that human beings also
don’t care about what

happens to them. a second possibility is that though both humans
and your dog are hurt when kicked, it is only human pain that mat- ters. But,
again, no rational person can believe this. Pain is pain wherever it occurs. If
your neighbour’s causing you pain is wrong be- cause of the pain that is caused,
we cannot rationally ignore or dis- miss the moral relevance of the pain that
your dog feels.

Philosophers who hold indirect duty views—and many still do—have
come to understand that they must avoid the two defects just noted: that is,
both the view that animals don’t feel anything as well as the idea that only
human pain can be morally relevant. among such thinkers the sort of view now
favoured is one or other form of what is called contractarianism.

here, very crudely, is the root idea: morality consists of a set
of rules that individuals voluntarily agree to abide by, as we do when we sign
a contract (hence the name contractarianism). Those who understand and accept
the terms of the contract are covered directly; they have rights created and
recognized by, and protected in, the contract. and these contractors can also
have protection spelled out for others who, though they lack the ability to
understand morality and so cannot sign the contract themselves, are loved or
cherished by those who can. Thus young children, for example, are unable to
sign contracts and lack rights. But they are protected by the contract
nonetheless because of the sentimental interests of others, most notably their
parents. So we have, then, duties involving these children, duties regarding
them, but no duties to them. Our duties in their case are indirect duties to
other human beings, usually their parents.

as for animals, since they cannot understand contracts, they obvi-
ously cannot sign; and since they cannot sign, they have no rights. Like
children, however, some animals are the objects of the sentimen- tal interest
of others. You, for example, love your dog or cat. So those animals that enough
people care about (companion animals, whales, baby seals, the american bald
eagle), though they lack rights them- selves, will be protected because of the
sentimental interests of people. I have, then, according to contractariansim,
no duty directly to your dog or any other animal, not even the duty not to
cause them pain or suffering; my duty not to hurt them is a duty I have to
those people who care about what happens to them. as for other animals, where
no or little sentimental interest is present—in the case of farm animals, for
example, or laboratory rats—what duties we have grow weaker and weaker, perhaps
to vanishing point. The pain and death they endure, though real, are not wrong
if no one cares about them.

When it comes to the moral status of animals, contractarianism
could be a hard view to refute if it were an adequate theoretical ap- proach to
the moral status of human beings. It is not adequate in this latter respect,
however, which makes the question of its adequacy in the former case, regarding
animals, utterly moot. For consider: mo- rality, according to the (crude)
contractarian position before us, con- sists of rules that people agree to
abide by. What people? Well, enough to make a difference—enough, that is,
collectively to have the power to enforce the rules that are drawn up in the
contract. That is very well and good for the signatories but not so good for
anyone who is not asked to sign. and there is nothing in contractarianism of
the sort we are discussing that guarantees or requires that everyone will have
a chance to participate equally in framing the rules of morality. The result is
that this approach to ethics could sanction the most blatant forms of social,
economic, moral, and political injustice, ranging from a repressive caste
system to systematic racial or sexual discrimi- nation. Might, according to
this theory, does make right. Let those who are the victims of injustice suffer
as they will. It matters not so long as no one else—no contractor, or too few
of them—cares about it. Such a theory takes one’s moral breath away . . . as
if, for example, there would be nothing wrong with apartheid in South africa if
few white South africans were upset by it. a theory with so little to recom-
mend it at the level of the ethics of our treatment of our fellow humans cannot
have anything more to recommend it when it comes to the ethics of how we treat
our fellow animals.

The version of contractarianism just examined is, as I have noted,
a crude variety, and in fairness to those of a contractarian persuasion it must
be noted that much more refined, subtle, and ingenious variet- ies are
possible. For example, John Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, sets forth a
version of contractarianism that forces contractors to ignore the accidental
features of being a human being—for example, whether one is white or black,
male or female, a genius or of modest intellect. Only by ignoring such
features, Rawls believes, can we ensure that the principles of justice that
contractors would agree upon are not based on bias or prejudice. Despite the
improvement a view such as Rawls’s represents over the cruder forms of
contractarianism, it remains defi- cient: it systematically denies that we have
direct duties to those human beings who do not have a sense of justice—young
children, for in- stance, and many mentally retarded humans. and yet it seems
reason- ably certain that, were we to torture a young child or a retarded
elder, we would be doing something that wronged him or her, not

something that would be wrong if (and only if ) other humans with
a sense of justice were upset. and since this is true in the case of these
humans, we cannot rationally deny the same in the case of animals.

Indirect duty views, then, including the best among them, fail to
command our rational assent. Whatever ethical theory we should accept
rationally, therefore, it must at least recognize that we have some duties
directly to animals, just as we have some duties directly to each other. The
next two theories I’ll sketch attempt to meet this requirement.

The first I call the cruelty-kindness view. Simply stated, this
says that we have a direct duty to be kind to animals and a direct duty not to
be cruel to them. Despite the familiar, reassuring ring of these ideas, I do
not believe that this view offers an adequate theory. To make this clearer,
consider kindness. a kind person acts from a certain kind of motive—compassion
or concern, for example. and that is a virtue. But there is no guarantee that a
kind act is a right act. If I am a generous racist, for example, I will be
inclined to act kindly towards members of my own race, favouring their
interests above those of others. My kind- ness would be real and, so far as it
goes, good. But I trust it is too obvi- ous to require argument that my kind
acts may not be above moral reproach—may, in fact, be positively wrong because
rooted in injus- tice. So kindness, notwithstanding its status as a virtue to
be encour- aged, simply will not carry the weight of a theory of right action.

Cruelty fares no better. People or their acts are cruel if they
display either a lack of sympathy for or, worse, the presence of enjoyment in
another’s suffering. Cruelty in all its guises is a bad thing, a tragic human
failing. But just as a person’s being motivated by kindness does not guarantee
that he or she does what is right, so the absence of cru- elty does not ensure
that he or she avoids doing what is wrong. Many people who perform abortions,
for example, are not cruel, sadistic people. But that fact alone does not
settle the terribly difficult question of the morality of abortion. The case is
no different when we examine the ethics of our treatment of animals. So, yes,
let us be for kindness and against cruelty. But let us not suppose that being
for the one and against the other answers questions about moral right and
wrong.

Some people think that the theory we are looking for is
utilitarianism. a utilitarian accepts two moral principles. The first is that
of equality: everyone’s interests count, and similar interests must be counted
as having similar weight or importance. White or black, american or Iranian,
human or animal—everyone’s pain or frustration matter, and matter just as much
as the equivalent pain or frustration of anyone

else. The second principle a utilitarian accepts is that of
utility: do the act that will bring about the best balance between satisfaction
and frus- tration for everyone affected by the outcome.

as a utilitarian, then, here is how I am to approach the task of
de- ciding what I morally ought to do: I must ask who will be affected if I
choose to do one thing rather than another, how much each indi- vidual will be
affected, and where the best results are most likely to lie—which option, in
other words, is most likely to bring about the best results, the best balance
between satisfaction and frustration. That option, whatever it may be, is the
one I ought to choose. That is where my moral duty lies.

The great appeal of utilitarianism rests with its uncompromising
egalitarianism: everyone’s interests count and count as much as the like
interests of everyone else. The kind of odious discrimination that some forms
of contractarianism can justify—discrimination based on race or sex, for
example—seems disallowed in principle by utili- tarianism, as is speciesism,
systematic discrimination based on spe- cies membership.

The equality we find in utilitarianism, however, is not the sort
an advocate of animal or human rights should have in mind. Utilitarian- ism has
no room for the equal moral rights of different individuals because it has no
room for their equal inherent value or worth. What has value for the
utilitarian is the satisfaction of an individual’s inter- ests, not the
individual whose interests they are. a universe in which you satisfy your
desire for water, food, and warmth is, other things being equal, better than a
universe in which these desires are frus- trated. and the same is true in the
case of an animal with similar desires. But neither you nor the animal have any
value in your own right. Only your feelings do.

here is an analogy to help make the philosophical point clearer: a
cup contains different liquids, sometimes sweet, sometimes bitter, sometimes a
mix of the two. What has value are the liquids: the sweeter the better, the
bitterer the worse. The cup, the container, has no value. It is what goes into
it, not what they go into, that has value. For the utilitarian you and I are
like the cup; we have no value as in- dividuals and thus no equal value. What
has value is what goes into us, what we serve as receptacles for; our feelings
of satisfaction have positive value, our feelings of frustration negative
value.

Serious problems arise for utilitarianism when we remind our-
selves that it enjoins us to bring about the best consequences. What does this
mean? It doesn’t mean the best consequences for me

alone, or for my
family or friends, or any other person taken indi- vidually. No, what we must
do is, roughly, as follows: we must add up (somehow!) the separate
satisfactions and frustrations of everyone likely to be affected by our choice,
the satisfactions in one column, the frustrations in the other. We must total
each column for each of the options before us. That is what it means to say the
theory is ag- gregative. and then we must choose that option which is most
likely to bring about the best balance of totalled satisfactions over totalled
frustrations. Whatever act would lead to this outcome is the one we ought
morally to perform—it is where our moral duty lies. and that act quite clearly
might not be the same one that would bring about the best results for me
personally, or for my family or friends, or for a lab animal. The best
aggregated consequences for everyone con- cerned are not necessarily the best
for each individual.

That utilitarianism is an aggregative
theory—different individuals’ satisfactions or frustrations are added, or
summed, or totalled—is the key objection to this theory. My aunt Bea is old,
inactive, a cranky, sour person, though not physically ill. She prefers to go
on living. She is also rather rich. I could make a fortune if I could get my
hands on her money, money she intends to give me in any event, after she dies,
but which she refuses to give me now. In order to avoid a huge tax bite, I plan
to donate a handsome sum of my profits to a local children’s hos- pital. Many,
many children will benefit from my generosity, and much joy will be brought to
their parents, relatives, and friends. If I don’t get the money rather soon,
all these ambitions will come to naught. The once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to
make a real killing will be gone. Why, then, not kill my aunt Bea? Oh, of
course I might get caught. But I’m no fool and, besides, her doctor can be
counted on to cooperate (he has an eye for the same investment and I happen to
know a good deal about his shady past). The deed can be done . . .
professionally, shall we say. There is very little chance of getting caught.
and as for my con- science being guilt-ridden, I am a resourceful sort of
fellow and will take more than sufficient comfort—as I lie on the beach at
acapulco— in contemplating the joy and health I have brought to so many others.

Suppose aunt Bea is killed and the rest of
the story comes out as told. Would I have done anything wrong? anything
immoral? One would have thought that I had. Not according to utilitarianism.
Since what I have done has brought about the best balance between to- talled
satisfaction and frustration for all those affected by the out- come, my action
is not wrong. Indeed, in killing aunt Bea the physician and I did what duty
required.

This same kind of argument can be repeated in all sorts of cases,
illustrating, time after time, how the utilitarian’s position leads to results
that impartial people find morally callous. It is wrong to kill my aunt Bea in
the name of bringing about the best results for others. a good end does not
justify an evil means. any adequate moral theory will have to explain why this
is so. Utilitarianism fails in this respect and so cannot be the theory we
seek.

What to do? Where to begin anew? The place to begin, I think, is
with the utilitarian’s view of the value of the individual—or, rather, lack of
value. In its place, suppose we consider that you and I, for ex- ample, do have
value as individuals—what we’ll call inherent value. To say we have such value
is to say that we are something more than, something different from, mere
receptacles. Moreover, to ensure that we do not pave the way for such
injustices as slavery or sexual discrimi- nation, we must believe that all who
have inherent value have it equally, regardless of their sex, race, religion,
birthplace, and so on. Similarly to be discarded as irrelevant are one’s
talents or skills, intelligence and wealth, personality or pathology, whether
one is loved and ad- mired or despised and loathed. The genius and the retarded
child, the prince and the pauper, the brain surgeon and the fruit vendor,
Mother Teresa and the most unscrupulous used-car salesman—all have inherent
value, all possess it equally, and all have an equal right to be treated with
respect, to be treated in ways that do not reduce them to the status of things,
as if they existed as resources for others. My value as an individual is
independent of my usefulness to you. Yours is not dependent on your usefulness
to me. For either of us to treat the other in ways that fail to show respect
for the other’s indepen- dent value is to act immorally, to violate the
individual’s rights.

Some of the rational virtues of this view—what I call the rights
view—should be evident. Unlike (crude) contractarianism, for exam- ple, the rights
view in principle denies the moral tolerability of any and all forms of racial,
sexual, or social discrimination; and unlike utili- tarianism, this view in
principle denies that we can justify good results by using evil means that
violate an individual’s rights—denies, for ex- ample, that it could be moral to
kill my aunt Bea to harvest beneficial consequences for others. That would be
to sanction the disrespectful treatment of the individual in the name of the
social good, something the rights view will not—categorically will not—ever
allow.

The rights view, I believe, is rationally the most satisfactory
moral theory. It surpasses all other theories in the degree to which it illumi-
nates and explains the foundation of our duties to one another—the

domain of human morality. On this score it has the best reasons,
the best arguments, on its side. Of course, if it were possible to show that
only human beings are included within its scope, then a person like myself, who
believes in animal rights, would be obliged to look elsewhere.

But attempts to limit its scope to humans only can be shown to be
rationally defective. animals, it is true, lack many of the abilities humans
possess. They can’t read, do higher mathematics, build a bookcase, or make baba
ghanoush. Neither can many human beings, however, and yet we don’t (and
shouldn’t) say that they (these humans) therefore have less inherent value,
less of a right to be treated with re- spect, than do others. It is the
similarities between those human beings who most clearly, most
noncontroversially have such value (the people reading this, for example), not
our differences, that matter most. and the really crucial, the basic similarity
is simply this: we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious
creature having an indi- vidual welfare that has importance to us whatever our
usefulness to others. We want and prefer things, believe and feel things,
recall and expect things. and all these dimensions of our life, including our
plea- sure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frus-
tration, our continued existence or our untimely death—all make a difference to
the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. as the
same is true of those animals that concern us (the ones that are eaten and
trapped, for example), they too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of
a life, with inherent value of their own.

Some there are who resist the idea that animals have inherent
value. “Only humans have such value,” they profess. how might this narrow view
be defended? Shall we say that only humans have the requisite intelligence, or
autonomy, or reason? But there are many, many humans who fail to meet these
standards and yet are reason- ably viewed as having value above and beyond
their usefulness to others. Shall we claim that only humans belong to the right
species, the species Homo sapiens? But this is blatant speciesism. Will it be
said, then, that all—and only—humans have immortal souls? Then our opponents have
their work cut out for them. I am myself not ill- disposed to the proposition
that there are immortal souls. Personally, I profoundly hope I have one. But I
would not want to rest my posi- tion on a controversial ethical issue on the
even more controversial question about who or what has an immortal soul. That
is to dig one’s hole deeper, not to climb out. Rationally, it is better to
resolve moral issues without making more controversial assumptions than are

needed. The question of who has inherent value is such a question,
one that is resolved more rationally without the introduction of the idea of
immortal souls than by its use.

Well, perhaps some will say that animals have some inherent value,
only less than we have. Once again, however, attempts to defend this view can
be shown to lack rational justification. What could be the basis of our having
more inherent value than animals? Their lack of reason, or autonomy, or
intellect? Only if we are willing to make the same judgement in the case of
humans who are similarly deficient. But it is not true that such humans—the
retarded child, for example, or the mentally deranged—have less inherent value
than you or I. Neither, then, can we rationally sustain the view that animals
like them in being the experiencing subjects of a life have less inherent
value. All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be human
animals or not.

Inherent value, then, belongs equally to those who are the experi-
encing subjects of a life. Whether it belongs to others—to rocks and rivers,
trees and glaciers, for example—we do not know and may never know. But neither
do we need to know, if we are to make the case for animal rights. We do not
need to know, for example, how many people are eligible to vote in the next
presidential election before we can know whether I am. Similarly, we do not
need to know how many individuals have inherent value before we can know that
some do. When it comes to the case for animal rights, then, what we need to
know is whether the animals that, in our culture, are rou- tinely eaten,
hunted, and used in our laboratories, for example, are like us in being
subjects of a life. and we do know this. We do know that many—literally,
billions and billions—of these animals are the subjects of a life in the sense
explained and so have inherent value if we do. and since, in order to arrive at
the best theory of our duties to one another, we must recognize our equal
inherent value as individu- als, reason—not sentiment, not emotion—reason
compels us to rec- ognize the equal inherent value of these animals and, with
this, their equal right to be treated with respect.

That, very roughly, is the shape and feel of the case for animal
rights. Most of the details of the supporting argument are missing. They are to
be found in the book to which I alluded earlier. here, the details go begging,
and I must, in closing, limit myself to four final points.

The first is how the theory that underlies the case for animal
rights shows that the animal rights movement is a part of, not antagonistic

to, the human rights movement. The theory that rationally grounds
the rights of animals also grounds the rights of humans. Thus those involved in
the animal rights movement are partners in the struggle to secure respect for
human rights—the rights of women, for exam- ple, or minorities, or workers. The
animal rights movement is cut from the same moral cloth as these.

Second, having set out the broad outlines of the rights view, I
can now say why its implications for farming and science, among other fields,
are both clear and uncompromising. In the case of the use of animals in
science, the rights view is categorically abolitionist. Lab animals are not our
tasters; we are not their kings. Because these animals are treated routinely,
systematically as if their value were reducible to their usefulness to others,
they are routinely, sys- tematically treated with a lack of respect, and thus
are their rights routinely, systematically violated. This is just as true when
they are used in trivial, duplicative, unnecessary, or unwise research as it is
when they are used in studies that hold out real promise of human benefits. We
can’t justify harming or killing a human being (my aunt Bea, for example) just
for these sorts of reason. Neither can we do so even in the case of so lowly a
creature as a laboratory rat. It is not just refinement or reduction that is
called for, not just larger, cleaner cages, not just more generous use of
anaesthetic or the elimi- nation of multiple surgery, not just tidying up the
system. It is com- plete replacement. The best we can do when it comes to using
animals in science is—not to use them. That is where our duty lies, according
to the rights view.

as for commercial animal agriculture, the rights view takes a
simi- lar abolitionist position. The fundamental moral wrong here is not that
animals are kept in stressful close confinement or in isolation, or that their
pain and suffering, their needs and preferences are ig- nored or discounted.
all these are wrong, or course, but they are not the fundamental wrong. They
are symptoms and effects of the deeper systematic wrong that allows these
animals to be viewed and treated as lacking independent value, as resources for
us—as, indeed, a re- newable resource. Giving farm animals more space, more
natural en- vironments, more companions does not right the fundamental wrong,
any more than giving lab animals more anaesthesia or bigger, cleaner cages
would right the fundamental wrong in their case. Noth- ing less than the total
dissolution of commercial animal agriculture will do this, just as, for similar
reasons I won’t develop at length here, morality requires nothing less than the
total elimination of hunting

and trapping for commercial and sporting ends. The rights view’s
implications, then, as I have said, are clear and uncompromising.

My last two points are about philosophy, my profession. It is,
most obviously, no substitute for political action. The words I have written
here and in other places by themselves don’t change a thing. It is what we do
with the thoughts that the words express—our acts, our deeds—that changes
things. all that philosophy can do, and all I have attempted, is to offer a
vision of what our deeds should aim at. and the why. But not the how.

Finally, I am reminded of my thoughtful critic, the one I
mentioned earlier, who chastised me for being too cerebral. Well, cerebral I
have been: indirect duty views, utilitarianism, contractarianism—hardly the
stuff deep passions are made of. I am also reminded, however, of the image
another friend once set before me—the image of the bal- lerina as expressive of
disciplined passion. Long hours of sweat and toil, of loneliness and practice,
of doubt and fatigue: those are the discipline of her craft. But the passion is
there too, the fierce drive to excel, to speak through her body, to do it
right, to pierce our minds. That is the image of philosophy I would leave with
you, not “too cere- bral” but disciplined passion. Of the discipline enough has
been seen. as for the passion: there are times, and these not infrequent, when
tears come to my eyes when I see, or read, or hear of the wretched plight of
animals in the hands of humans. Their pain, their suffering, their loneliness,
their innocence, their death. anger. Rage. Pity. Sorrow. Disgust. The whole
creation groans under the weight of the evil we humans visit upon these mute,
powerless creatures. It is our hearts, not just our heads, that call for an end
to it all, that demand of us that we overcome, for them, the habits and forces
behind their systematic oppression. all great movements, it is written, go
through three stages: ridicule, discussion, adoption. It is the realization of
this third stage, adoption, that requires both our passion and our disci-
pline, our hearts and our heads. The fate of animals is in our hands. God grant
we are equal to the task.

a right, properly understood, is a claim, or
potential claim, that one party may exercise against another. the target
against whom such a claim may be registered can be a single person, a group, a
commu- nity, or (perhaps) all humankind. the content of rights claims also
varies greatly: repayment of loans, nondiscrimination by employers,
noninterference by the state, and so on. to comprehend any genuine right fully,
therefore, we must know who holds the right, against whom it is held, and to
what it is a right. alternative sources of rights add complexity. Some rights
are grounded in constitution and law (e.g., the right of an accused to trial by
jury); some rights are moral but give no legal claims (e.g., my right to your
keeping the promise you gave me); and some rights (e.g., against theft or
assault) are rooted both in morals and in law. the differing targets, contents,
and sources of rights, and their inevitable conflict, together weave a tangled
web. Notwithstanding all such complications, this much is clear about rights in
general: they are in every case claims, or potential claims, within a community
of moral agents. rights arise, and can be intelligibly defended, only among
beings who actually do, or can, make moral claims against

one another. Whatever else rights may be, therefore, they are
neces- sarily human; their possessors are persons, human beings. . . .

humans confront choices that are purely moral; humans—but
certainly not dogs or mice—lay down moral laws, for others and for themselves.
human beings are self-legislative, morally autonomous.

animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense of that
word) lack this capacity for free moral judgment. they are not beings of a kind
capable of exercising or responding to moral claims. animals therefore have no
rights, and they can have none. this is the core of the argument about the
alleged rights of animals. the holders of rights must have the capacity to
comprehend rules of duty, governing all in- cluding themselves. In applying
such rules, the holders of rights must recognize possible conflicts between
what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings
capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be
correctly invoked.

humans have such moral capacities. they are in this sense self-
legislative, are members of communities governed by moral rules, and do possess
rights. animals do not have such moral capacities. they are not morally
self-legislative, cannot possibly be members of a truly moral community, and
therefore cannot possess rights. In con- ducting research on animal subjects,
therefore, we do not violate their rights, because they have none to violate.

to animate life, even in its simplest forms, we give a certain
natu- ral reverence. But the possession of rights presupposes a moral status
not attained by the vast majority of living things. We must not infer,
therefore, that a live being has, simply in being alive, a “right” to its life.
the assertion that all animals, only because they are alive and have interests,
also possess the “right to life” is an abuse of that phrase, and wholly without
warrant.

It does not follow from this, however, that we are morally free to
do anything we please to animals. certainly not. In our dealings with ani-
mals, as in our dealings with other human beings, we have obligations that do
not arise from claims against us based on rights. rights entail obligations,
but many of the things one ought to do are in no way tied to another’s
entitlement. rights and obligations are not reciprocals of one another, and it
is a serious mistake to suppose that they are.

Illustrations are helpful. Obligations may arise from internal
com- mitments made: physicians have obligations to their patients not grounded
merely in their patients’ rights. teachers have such obliga- tions to their
students, shepherds to their dogs, and cowboys to their horses. Obligations may
arise from differences of status: adults owe special care when playing with
young children, and children owe spe- cial care when playing with young pets.
Obligations may arise from special relationships: the payment of my son’s
college tuition is some- thing to which he may have no right, although it may
be my obliga- tion to bear the burden if I reasonably can; my dog has no right
to daily exercise and veterinary care, but I do have the obligation to provide
these things for her. Obligations may arise from particular acts or
circumstances: one may be obliged to another for a special kindness done, or
obliged to put an animal out of its misery in view of its condition—although
neither the human benefactor nor the dying animal may have had a claim of
right.

plainly, the grounds of our obligations to humans and to animals
are manifold and cannot be formulated simply. Some hold that there is a general
obligation to do no gratuitous harm to sentient creatures (the principle of
nonmaleficence); some hold that there is a general obligation to do good to
sentient creatures when that is reasonably within one’s power (the principle of
beneficence). In our dealings with animals, few will deny that we are at least
obliged to act humanely—that is, to treat them with the decency and concern
that we owe, as sensitive human beings, to other sentient creatures. to treat
animals humanely, however, is not to treat them as humans or as the holders of
rights.

a common objection, which deserves a response, may be para-
phrased as follows:

If having rights requires being able to make moral claims, to
grasp and apply moral laws, then many humans—the brain-damaged, the comatose,
the senile—who plainly lack those capacities must be with- out rights. But that
is absurd. this proves [the critic concludes] that rights do not depend on the
presence of moral capacities.

this objection fails; it mistakenly treats an essential feature of
humanity as though it were a screen for sorting humans. the ca- pacity for
moral judgment that distinguishes humans from animals is not a test to be
administered to human beings one by one. per- sons who are unable, because of
some disability, to perform the full moral functions natural to human beings
are certainly not for that reason ejected from the moral community. the issue
is one of kind. humans are of such a kind that they may be the subject of
experiments only with their voluntary consent. the choices they make freely
must be respected. animals are of such a kind that it is impossible for them,
in principle, to give or withhold voluntary consent or to make a moral choice.
What humans retain when dis- abled, animals have never had.

a second objection, also often made, may be paraphrased as
follows: capacities will not succeed in distinguishing humans from the other
animals. animals also reason; animals also communicate with one another;
animals also care passionately for their young; animals also exhibit desires
and preferences. Features of moral relevance— rationality, interdependence, and
love—are not exhibited uniquely by human beings. therefore [this critic
concludes], there can be no solid moral distinction between humans and other
animals.

this criticism misses the central point. It is not the ability to
com- municate or to reason, or dependence on one another, or care for the
young, or the exhibition of preference, or any such behavior that marks the
critical divide. analogies between human families and those of monkeys, or
between human communities and those of wolves, and the like, are entirely
beside the point. patterns of conduct are not at issue. animals do indeed
exhibit remarkable behavior at times. conditioning, fear, instinct, and
intelligence all contribute to species survival. Membership in a community of
moral agents never- theless remains impossible for them. actors subject to
moral judg- ment must be capable of grasping the generality of an ethical
premise in a practical syllogism. humans act immorally often enough, but only
they—never wolves or monkeys—can discern, by applying some moral rule to the
facts of a case, that a given act ought or ought not to be performed. the moral
restraints imposed by humans on them- selves are thus highly abstract and are
often in conflict with the self- interest of the agent. communal behavior among
animals, even when most intelligent and most endearing, does not approach
autonomous morality in this fundamental sense.

Genuinely moral acts have an internal as well as an external di-
mension. thus, in law, an act can be criminal only when the guilty deed, the
actus reus, is done with a guilty mind, mens rea. No animal can ever commit a
crime; bringing animals to criminal trial is the mark of primitive ignorance.
the claims of moral right are similarly inapplicable to them. Does a lion have
a right to eat a baby zebra? Does a baby zebra have a right not to be eaten?
Such questions, mis- takenly invoking the concept of right where it does not belong,
do not make good sense.

Tom Regan has
produced what is perhaps the definitive defense of the view that the basic
moral rights of at least some non-human ani- mals are in no way inferior to our
own. In The Case for Animal Rights, he argues that all normal mammals over a
year of age have the same basic moral rights.1 Non-human mammals have
essentially the same right not to be harmed or killed as we do. I shall call
this “the strong animal rights position,” although it is weaker than the claims
made by some animal liberationists in that it ascribes rights to only some sen-
tient animals.2 I will argue that Regan’s case for the strong animal rights
position is unpersuasive and that this position entails consequences which a
reasonable person cannot accept. I do not deny that some non-human animals have
moral rights; indeed, I would extend the scope of the rights claim to include
all sentient animals, that is, all those capable of having experiences,
including experiences of pleasure or satisfac- tion and pain, suffering, or
frustration.3 However, I do not think that the moral rights of most nonhuman
animals are identical in strength to those of persons.4 The rights of most
non-human animals may be overridden in circumstances which would not justify
overriding the rights of persons. There are, for instance, compelling realities
which sometimes require that we kill animals for reasons which could not justify the killing of
persons. I will call this view “the weak animal rights” position, even though
it ascribes rights to a wider range of ani- mals than does the strong animal
rights position.

I will begin by summarizing Regan’s case for the strong animal
rights position and noting two problems with it. Next, I will explore some
consequences of the strong animal rights position which I think are
unacceptable. Finally, I will outline the case for the weak animal rights
position.

Regan’s Case

Regan’s argument moves through three stages. First, he argues that
normal, mature mammals are not only sentient but have other mental capacities
as well. These include the capacities for emotion, memory, belief, desire, the
use of general concepts, intentional action, a sense of the future, and some
degree of self-awareness. Creatures with such capacities are said to be
subjects-of-a-life. They are not only alive in the biological sense but have a
psychological identity over time and an existence which can go better or worse
for them. Thus, they can be harmed or benefited. These are plausible claims,
and well defended. One of the strongest parts of the book is the rebuttal of
philosophers, such as R. G. Frey, who object to the application of such
mentalistic terms to creatures that do not use a human-style language.5 The
second and third stages of the argument are more problematic.

In the second stage, Regan argues that subjects-of-a-life have in-
herent value. His concept of inherent value grows out of his opposi- tion to
utilitarianism. Utilitarian moral theory, he says, treats individuals as “mere
receptacles” for morally significant value, in that harm to one individual may
be justified by the production of a greater net benefit to other individuals.
In opposition to this, he holds that subjects-of-a-life have a value
independent of both the value they may place upon their lives or experiences
and the value others may place upon them.

Inherent value, Regan argues, does not come in degrees. To hold
that some individuals have more inherent value than others is to adopt a
“perfectionist” theory, i.e., one which assigns different moral worth to
individuals according to how well they are thought to exem- plify some
virtue(s), such as intelligence or moral autonomy. Perfec- tionist theories
have been used, at least since the time of Aristotle, to rationalize such
injustices as slavery and male domination, as well as the unrestrained
exploitation of animals. Regan argues that if we

reject these injustices, then we must also reject perfectionism
and conclude that all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value. Moral
agents have no more inherent value than moral patients, i.e.,
subjects-of-a-life who are not morally responsible for their actions.

In the third phase of the argument, Regan uses the thesis of equal
inherent value to derive strong moral rights for all subjects-of-a-life. This
thesis underlies the Respect Principle, which forbids us to treat beings who
have inherent value as mere receptacles, i.e., mere means to the production of
the greatest overall good. This principle, in turn, underlies the Harm
Principle, which says that we have a direct prima facie duty not to harm beings
who have inherent value. Together, these principles give rise to moral rights.
Rights are defined as valid claims, claims to certain goods and against certain
beings, i.e., moral agents. Moral rights generate duties not only to refrain
from inflict- ing harm upon beings with inherent value but also to come to
their aid when they are threatened by other moral agents. Rights are not
absolute but may be overridden in certain circumstances. Just what these
circumstances are we will consider later. But first, let’s look at some
difficulties in the theory as thus far presented.

The Mystery of Inherent Value

Inherent value is a key concept in Regan’s theory. It is the
bridge between the plausible claim that all normal, mature mammals— human or
otherwise—are subjects-of-a-life and the more debatable claim that they all
have basic moral rights of the same strength. But it is a highly obscure
concept, and its obscurity makes it ill-suited to play this crucial role.

Inherent value is defined almost entirely in negative terms. It is
not dependent upon the value which either the inherently valuable indi- vidual
or anyone else may place upon that individual’s life or experi- ences. It is
not (necessarily) a function of sentience or any other mental capacity,
because, Regan says, some entities which are not sen- tient (e.g., trees,
rivers, or rocks) may, nevertheless, have inherent value. It cannot attach to
anything other than an individual; species, ecosystems, and the like cannot
have inherent value.

These are some of the things which inherent value is not. But what
is it? Unfortunately, we are not told. Inherent value appears as a mys- terious
non-natural property which we must take on faith. Regan says that it is a
postulate that subjects-of-a-life have inherent value, a

postulate justified by the fact that it avoids certain absurdities
which he thinks follow from a purely utilitarian theory. But why is the
postulate that subjects-of-a-life have inherent value? If the inherent value of
a being is completely independent of the value that it or anyone else places
upon its experiences, then why does the fact that it has certain sorts of
experiences constitute evidence that it has in- herent value? If the reason is
that subjects-of-a-life have an existence which can go better or worse for
them, then why isn’t the appropriate conclusion that all sentient beings have
inherent value, since they would all seem to meet that condition? Sentient but
mentally unso- phisticated beings may have a less extensive range of possible
satisfac- tions and frustrations, but why should it follow that they have—or
may have—no inherent value at all?

In the absence of a positive account of inherent value, it is also
dif- ficult to grasp the connection between being inherently valuable and
having moral rights. Intuitively, it seems that value is one thing, and rights
are another. It does not seem incoherent to say that some things (e.g.,
mountains, rivers, redwood trees) are inherently valuable and yet are not the
sorts of things which can have moral rights. Nor does it seem incoherent to
ascribe inherent value to some things which are not individuals, e.g., plant or
animal species, though it may well be incoherent to ascribe moral rights to
such things.

In short, the concept of inherent value seems to create at least
as many problems as it solves. If inherent value is based on some natural
property, then why not try to identify that property and explain its moral
significance, without appealing to inherent value? And if it is not based on
any natural property, then why should we believe in it? That it may enable us
to avoid some of the problems faced by the utili- tarian is not a sufficient
reason, if it creates other problems which are just as serious.

Is There a Sharp Line?

Perhaps the most serious problems are those that arise when we try
to apply the strong animal rights position to animals other than normal, mature
mammals. Regan’s theory requires us to divide all living things into two
categories: those which have the same inherent value and the same basic moral
rights that we do, and those which have no inherent value and presumably no
moral rights. But wherever we try to draw the line, such a sharp division is
implausible.

Why Speak of “Animal Rights” at All?

If, as I have argued, reality precludes our treating all animals
as our moral equals, then why should we still ascribe rights to them? Every-
one agrees that animals are entitled to some protection against human abuse,
but why speak of animal rights if we are not prepared to accept most animals as
our moral equals? The weak animal rights position may seem an unstable
compromise between the bold claim that animals have the same basic moral rights
that we do and the more common view that animals have no rights at all.

It is probably impossible to either prove or disprove the thesis
that animals have moral rights by producing an analysis of the concept of a
moral right and checking to see if some or all animals satisfy the conditions
for having rights. The concept of a moral right is complex, and it is not clear
which of its strands are essential. Paradigm rights holders, i.e., mature and
mentally competent persons, are both ratio- nal and morally autonomous beings
and sentient subjects-of-a-life. Opponents of animal rights claim that
rationality and moral auton- omy are essential for the possession of rights,
while defenders of animal rights claim that they are not. The ordinary concept
of a moral right is probably not precise enough to enable us to determine who
is right on purely definitional grounds.

If logical analysis will not answer the question of whether ani-
mals have moral rights, practical considerations may, nevertheless, incline us
to say that they do. The most plausible alternative to the view that animals
have moral rights is that, while they do not have rights, we are, nevertheless,
obligated not to be cruel to them. Regan argues persuasively that the
injunction to avoid being cruel to animals is inadequate to express our
obligations towards ani- mals, because it focuses on the mental states of those
who cause animal suffering, rather than on the harm done to the animals
themselves. . . . Cruelty is inflicting pain or suffering and either taking
pleasure in that pain or suffering or being more or less in- different to it.
Thus, to express the demand for the decent treat- ment of animals in terms of
the rejection of cruelty is to invite the too easy response that those who
subject animals to suffering are not being cruel because they regret the
suffering they cause but sincerely believe that what they do is justified. The
injunction to avoid cruelty is also inadequate in that it does not preclude the
kill- ing of animals—for any reason, however trivial—so long as it is done
relatively painlessly.

 

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Chapter 5 & 6 David & Goliath

After reading David and Goliath, Chapter 5, please answer the following questions:

1) Section two of chapter five discusses the odd reactions of the Londoners to the Blitz. Not only were the Londoners stoic, but Gladwell notes “Civilians from other countries also turned out to be unexpectedly resilient in the face of bombing” (130). Gladwell provides some evidence and explanation for the reaction from an outside source, what is the source and why is it credible?

2) In section three, we finally get to Gladwell’s thesis for the chapter. What is his argument, and how does he tie it to the previous chapter?

3) Gladwell talks about society’s assumptions about obstacles like dyslexia and trauma. As he explains it, what does society assume?

Chapter 6:

In the 1960s, who was in control of Birmingham, Alabama? Why was it a dangerous place and time for the civil rights movement? Gladwell uses the metaphor of Brer Rabbit, or the “trickster hero,” in this chapter. How does this story compare to the events in the chapter? Explain the parallel here. Wyatt Walker’s methods of protest got a lot of criticism. What did people object to?

 

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Discussion Board reply – Justice vs. Actions

Topic: Justice vs. Actions

How do we reconcile acting “Christianly” toward suspects and convicted persons yet, at the same time, pursuing justice for the offender and for the victim?

What does justice mean in this sense?

Assignment: You are required to reply to the 2 classmates’ thread below. Each reply must be at least 150 words. Responding to a classmate’s thread requires both the addition of new ideas and analysis. A point made by the classmate must be addressed and built upon by your analysis in order to move the conversation forward. Thus, the reply is a rigorous assignment that requires you to build upon threads to develop deeper and more thorough discussion of the ideas introduced in the thread. As such, replies that merely affirm, restate, or unprofessionally quarrel with the previous post(s) and fail to make a valuable, substantive contribution to the discussion will receive appropriate point deductions.

Student #1

When considering the Christ-like way to treat a suspect or convicted person I think we first have to remember the fruit of the spirit which is “…love, joy, peace, forbearance, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control” (Genesis 5:22-23, NIV). These are important because it can become easy to dismiss or judge someone for their wrongdoings, but when we keep these characteristics in mind there is a shift that not only guards our hearts but helps us keep a godly and just perspective. With that being said we can not be naive about the situation or the crime, our job as law enforcers is to ensure that justice is being served fairly, and this requires us to do things that may seem hard at times, but are right according to the law. It is easy to make a vast judgment about a person based on their crime, which can lead to prejudice and biased actions, but to be able to uphold the law we have to keep a sound mind and trust the judicial process. I believe this comes from having a Christ-like perspective and understanding that there are consequences for our sins that have an equivalent punishment. We have to ask ourselves what the appropriate punishment is and act justly, based on facts not on feelings. This is true when it comes to faith as well, faith is not a feeling therefore if we can trust God and trust the word He has given us, we have to be able to trust the process that has been put in place to not only pursue justice but to pursue freedom for all parties. Justice based on these thoughts is upholding the law and maintaining integrity without allowing feelings to get involved or cloud our judgment. Resources: Myers, R., Williams, A. B., Wax, T., & Fuller, M. (2017). She reads truth Bible. Nashville, TN: Holman Bible.

Student #2

The truth is being a Christian is not a hat we wear around or an ideal you picking for becoming a follower of Jesus Christ. Jesus becomes the filter through which you make decisions treat others with fairness. Christianity towards suspect convicts, victims or relatives seems to be the wrong approach. as a follower of Christ, I will say we need to follow christ footstep. Being Christians will always do the right thing to serve and to act in love nevertheless, justice still has to prevail. When a sentence for a crime is not entirely carried out the way, it should people hearts are filled with schemes to do wrong. (Hebrews 12:6) The Lord disciplines the one he loves, and he chastens everyone he accepts as his son. The Christians corrections officers are challenged to go to work each day and be exposed to dangerous and possibly violent criminals out there and yet treat them with respect and love. The Christians judge is challenged to go to work each day and hear case after case of detailed criminal act, hear emotional victims statements and determine an appropriate sentences that will adequately address the goals of punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation and more (Foster, 2016, p. 35) the Christians prosecuting is tasked with constructing a solid case that will hold offenders accountable. The Christians defense attorney has to represent the offender and seek justices for their client. While still seeing that justice prevails and the list goes on. in summary, entering into the criminal justice sector as Christians have it is a promise of challenges, but I believe there will be many rewards and blessing depending on the chosen field. References (1) Foster, R.M. (2016). Corrections an introductory aspect; the way forward. (2) God. (1974). the Holy Bible New International version; Humans and forgiveness.

 

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Annotated Bibliography: are steroids an advantage to be used with caution?

Annotated Bibliography:

An annotated bibliography is a list of 5 sources, cited in MLA format, followed by a brief paragraph of notes describing the authors, the content, and the rationale for inclusion. Under each source, include an annotation describing the author or source credentials, a brief description of the main idea of the article, and how this particular source responds to your research question. There is an example of a complete annotated bibliography on the Week 4 module. Subject matter: Compile the bibliography around a particular research question you may have (ideas are listed on the next page). State your research topic at the topic of the page. After completing this research assignment, you will use the information and sources gathered to create an argument for a later essay.

 

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select a challenge you have faced and use your social imagination to demonstrate how society and its structures affected you in this situation

select a challenge you have faced and use your social imagination to demonstrate how society and its structures affected you in this situation

must be based on unemployment

 

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