Midterm Prompt #5: Give an institutional explanation to the crisis of 1914
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Thong Pham
A12067484
POLI 142K Magagna
Midterm Paper
May 11, 2017
Midterm Prompt #5: Provide an institutional explanation to the crisis of 1914
Throughout the history of humankind, the consolidation of nation states has always been coupled with perpetual violence in the form of wars. Whether it was for ideological reasons or politically or economically charged motives, these forces have been brewing for quite some times. At the turn of the twentieth century, technological advances had propelled the world forward to accomplish feats that had never been seen before. This was the beginning of aviation with the Wright Brothers’ invention of the modern day airplane in America. Across the Atlantic Ocean saw the invention of the first wireless radio transmission. In the field of power, the world was incredibly Eurocentric, with a handful of countries having the ability to rule most of the land on the planet (Fromkin 17). These actors: Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia would later turn out to be the main actors in the conflict that was yet to come. With progress in technology and wealth also resulted in our ability to harm each other on the battlefield. This all culminated by the summer of 1914, the world witnessed “the largest conflict that the planet had ever known,” in which there was war spreading from Europe to “Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific, and [even] the Americas” (Fromkin 4). The result was more than 20 million casualties in what at the time was the largest conflict the world had ever experienced: the Great War (Fromkin 4). In this paper, we will be examining the institutional factors behind the crisis of 1914 that led to the Great War itself.
There is a plethora of explanations to the crisis of 1914, but through a political science lens, World War I was significant due to its nature as a least-likely war, in that there is no single factor that caused this conflict, whether it be militarism, nationalism, or major power conflict, but rather it seemed to be a combination of many factors, as Fromkin explained throughout his book Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? Additionally, unlike previous conflicts, this war is least likely due to in the case of Europe in 1914, a systemic war between major powers would not be likely to happen in adherence to the causal theories of war. Structurally speaking, if there is a balance of power between European major powers, war should not occur. War in this case is a “breakdown or fundamental shift in balance of power;” however, by the summer of 1914, there was a stable balance of power amongst European major powers (Magagna “Significance of WW1”). On the other hand, World War I does not match the institutional theory of war, which will be discussed in further details later, either. This theory attempts to describe war and peace in terms of institutions and organizations, and according to this theory, World War I could happen in a balanced and stable political background if there are problems with Europe’s “domestic and international institution, or both” that could lead to the breakout of the war (Magagna “Significance of WW1”). Again, this was unlikely due to many experts stating that there were political institutions in Europe at the time with the ability to restrict and stop war, yet the war still happened. This peculiar phenomenon demands an answer, which shall be discussed later with emphasis on the institutional theory of war.
In order to have additional context in regards to World War I, it is imperative to examine the initial crisis in summer of 1914 that triggered the start of this global conflict. The crisis began when the heir to the throne of the Austria-Hungary empire was assassinated in such a way that the blame was seemingly put on a minor power and enemy of the state, Serbia. This forced the Austria-Hungarian government to respond due to the outrage that this caused, since the heir was considered to be what was holding the state together due to its ethnic composition of various groups. The alternative was grim: if the state failed to respond, it will fall apart, therefore it was set on crushing Serbia. On the other hand, Russia, Austria-Hungary’s enemy, desired the destruction of its enemy, or at least it in a vastly reduced state, could not allow Serbia to be crushed. What unfolded was the origin to this unlikely war between two major European powers, and due to the alliance system that European major powers were involved in, the result was all of Europe’s major powers being involved in this localized war (Magagna “WW1 Least Likely War”).
Back to the scope of institutional causal of war theory, it is important to further examine its background. This theory indicates that there is a decreased chance of war happening if there are institutional constraints that inhibit the ability of decision-makers to go to war as opposed to maintaining the peaceful status quo. In addition, institutionalists believe that war should not ensue unless there are gross miscalculations if there already exist international institutions with the ability to negotiate and bargain to prevent war (Magagna “WW1 Least Likely War”). This further accentuates the claim that World War I was an unlikely war since by 1914, the European Diplomatic Institution existed and had already took major parts in preventing systemic war on multiple international crises: the multiple Morocco crises, the Balkan Wars, and crises between France and German between 1890 and 1914 (Fromkin 76-81). Despite these institutional safeguards and large network to preserve peace, World War I still happened. Moreover, another form of institutional theory explains war as dependent on domestic institutions and the identity of a state as a war-oriented state or not (Magagna “WW1 Least Likely War”). More specifically, if a state if a “war state,” it will be more inclined to start a war rather than maintaining peace. Countries with preference to war (maintaining peace), it will not start a war unless it is at its wit’s end and will look for international solution. In the context of Europe in 1914, the only countries able to start systemic wars were major countries while minor countries could only contribute.
Next, according to Professor Magagna, the core logic of institutional theory at a deeper level pays attention on the facilitation and maintenance of peace through institutions. This depends on the regime types of the countries, whether they are war or peace states, credible commitment, and the enforceability of bargains (Margana “Institutional Theory”).
Furthermore, one needs to focus on the key logic of institutional analysis on the utility of war to further understand the institutional explanations behind the crisis of 1914. First, winning without war, or bargaining, always has much higher value than going to war and winning, due to the cost of the war have on a state. Bargaining will always have priority over war since it’s always better than going to war, albeit conflict is not inevitable and war can also happen. (Magagna “Institutional Theory”). Despite the inevitability of conflict, due to bargaining’s massive upsides, this leads us to the following question: How is war ever possible, especially in the case of World War I? Since it is less costly than systemic war, what would be happening for major powers in 1914 to not see that bargaining is superior to going to war? To institutionalists, the answer to systemic war lies in in institutional factors on international and domestic scales.
On a domestic level, states evaluate its decision on whether to go to war or not based on the war state problem. This creates a multiple-tiered outcomes of war scale, ranging from advantageous peace, to status quo, to going to war, and defeat, with defeat being the most undesirable outcome (Magagna “WW1 Least Likely War”). Advantageous peace refers to when every state only wanting to see a change in the status quo, or peace, only if it swings to their side thus giving them the advantage. Most states just prefer to keep peace just the way it has been. Going to war and suffering defeats are strongly avoided due to their significant costs. Also, states may be inclined to go to war because domestically it is a war state. There are a number of complex reasons as to why leaders might have preferred to go to war despite realizing that their states would benefit more from bargaining. International institutions also explain the reason why despite having institutional safeguards, countries still go to war like in 1914. First, bargaining fails predominantly at an international level, institutions may incorrectly signify their preferences for war and peace (Magagna “Institutional Theory”). This lack of information will result in international powers bluffing or miscalculating their ways into large scale conflicts. States, as a result, could be pushed to go to go to war against each other because of miscalculation in the absence of information.
This information on the inevitability of war despite institutional safeguards leads us to an interesting question: can going to war ever be better than engaging in bargain? In the context of the 1914 crisis, after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary can inflict damage and definitely defeat Serbia but that is not the case vice versa from Serbia’s side. (Magagna “Institutional Theory”). Serbia could only engage in conflict and deal some damage while cannot rely on Russia for support. This in turn begs the following question: Does Serbia’s decision to fight, which encompasses the decisions of many small countries retaliating against larger power, a result of misinformation? This is not necessarily true, considering from Serbia’s perspective, if it could inflict enough damage to Austria-Hungary, it could surive as a minor power (Magagna “Institutional Theory”). Another question that this raises is what course of action should states take if there are no bargain available to prevent World War I? Potential solutions to this could be Austria-Hungary accepting its destruction, or Russia accept the loss of its ally Serbia.
The institution theory on causal origins of war also provide the reasoning behind the crisis of 1914 on why states would engage in wars with each other. This is due to a misinformation on the actual length that World War I would take, or the short-war illusion. Prior to 1914, the inflexible military institutions, which were backward and slow to adapt, and the lack of civilian oversight due to the European government controlling of war plans, both contributed to falsifying information on consequences of having a major systemic war, which led to a falsehood that systemic war could be concluded under 12 months and victory could be easily achieved through launching of an offensive strategy. This was detrimental for European major countries, since by missing civilian oversight, the military lost the knowledge of civilians who were more well-versed about the economic and social cost of war (Magagna “Institutional Theory”). This absence of information created a “misperception problem” of cause and effect, with a false sense of security on weapons and sizes of military at the time, or cause, and the outcomes of the war, or effects, leading to miscalculated war plans coming from all major powers (Magagna “Institutional Theory”). Inaccurate information on the consequences of systemic war will eventually lead to information breakdown and institutional failures. An overrated expected size of the military would enable these powers to offensively finish the war in under 12 months. These two factors coupled together created a false war plan and resulted in these countries going to war against each other and unfortunately finding out that the war would last much longer and at a much greater cost than it was perceived to be. In retrospect, if military leaders gathered correct information and knew that military conflict would be long and costly to manage, there would have definitely been restraint from triggering this war. Looking back in hindsight, this was not the case because European military decision makers did not understand the costs and benefits of a long and drawn out war. The conservatism of the institutional thinking hindered them from seeing the bigger picture and making the correct decision, instead turning to reassuring civilians that the conflict would be short. With this flaw of institutional theory exposed, we now know why the crisis was 1914 happened despite ironically, institutional safeguards.
Works Cited
Fromkin, David. Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?. Kindle ed., New York: Vintage Book, Inc., 2004.
Magagna, Victor. “Institutional Theory” POLI 136 Lecture. University of California San Diego, La Jolla. 19 Apr. 2017. Lecture.
Magagna, Victor. “Significance of World War I” POLI 136 Lecture. University of California San Diego, La Jolla. 05 Apr. 2017. Lecture.
Magagna, Victor. “WWI as Least Likely War” POLI 136 Lecture. University of California San Diego, La Jolla. 07 Apr. 2017. Lecture.
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